Failure analysis through simulation is a useful practice to predict a system availability, maintenance times and costs over even long time periods. So far, computational tools for failure analysis have been designed mainly for electronic components. This paper presents a software tool aimed at carrying out the failure analysis of complex plants composed by a large number of different mechanical components. The proposed software, named TARAS, is described in detail, highlighting the features which make it particularly suitable for the mechanical components failure analysis. To demonstrate the software potential, a test-case is provided, consisting in the failure analysis of the transport line required to feed a pulverized coal steam plant for electric power production. The transportation plant consists in several belt conveyors, unloading machines, stacker-reclaimer machines etc. The work demonstrates a satisfactory capability of the software TARAS to cope with very complex mechanical systems.
Introduction
The interest in failure analysis is today increasing in the field of industrial plants; particular attention deserve power generation plants, for which the knowledge of the plant availability, so that the costs connected to fixing, are information of great importance for the plant managers. The data deriving from a failure analysis are in fact helpful in order to estimate the yearly production and the annual revenues; moreover, a powerful prediction method as the failure analysis may be useful in order to plan the most efficient maintenance strategy, or also to define targeted improvement interventions for the plant.
Failure mode and effects/criticality analysis (FMEA/FMECA) is a methodology allowing designers and operators to investigate the reliability of devices or processes in a systematic manner; this kind of analysis individuates the system failure modes and their causes and permits to estimate the unavailability time.
The FMEA/FMECA analysis of very complex systems, involving laborious calculations, is possible with the help of commercial software such as RELEX [1] . Said software permits the rapid analysis of different systems, thanks to user-friendly interfaces.
However, the software today in commerce are mostly dedicated to electronics industry and are not directly applicable to mechanical components. In this paper, the Authors aim to present the software TARAS, specifically dedicated to the failure analysis [2, 3, 4, 5] of mechanical systems.
As explained in the following sections, TARAS can be employed for the study of large and complex systems composed by numerous mechanical devices, also accounting for delays in the failure propagation, which are common in plants for the transport of bulk or liquid materials due to the presence of storages.
The software provides as output the system availability over a defined period other than the list, the history and the main parameters of each failure cause. Also the maintenance aspect was taken into account, since the software can provide as output the list of the maintenance operations (scheduled or not) and their cost. The results are presented through tables, diagrams and reports.
The software potential is demonstrated by the description of a case study, consisting in the feeding line of a coal fired power plant; the line transfers the solid fuel from a pier to the bunker storage, from which the boilers are fuelled. The investigated system is composed by different mechanical components such as continuous ship unloaders, belt conveyors, coal storage domes, stackerreclaimer machines, bunker feeding devices.
The Proposed Software
TARAS is a Montecarlo simulator [6, 7, 8] working on the basis of the system operational tree [2] . The latter is intended as the scheme of the logical interconnections, existing among the different components, on which the system correct operation depends.
Each component can be subdivided into its subcomponents down to the desired degree of precision. For this purpose, TARAS provides entities, called "nodes", of two different types:
• physical nodes: these nodes represent the selfstanding components, of which the failure rate λ i is known.
• logical nodes: these nodes represent those components whose failure rate depends on that of the underlying sub-components. Redundancy relations can be set defining for the logical node a k/n parameter, which indicates the number k of sub-components that need to be working over the total number n of sub-components, for a correct functioning.
For each node, the status variable S i is defined, indicating the component availability (S i = 1) or unavailability (S i = 0). To calculate the status variable, the solver extracts a random number x in the range between 0 and 1, and compares it to the component failure rate λ i ; if x ≤ λ i the component is declared out of order. The whole system operation is represented by the status of a logical node called "root", positioned at the top of the operational tree, where all the components connections converge.
TARAS proceeds for time steps, each representing one hour of operation. For each step, the algorithm analyzes all the nodes of the operational tree from the root to the furthest "leaves" and calculates a value of the components equivalent time. The latter accounts for the off-design operation by reducing or increasing the life accumulated by the component according to its degree of exploitation. The flow of the equivalent time can be set as dependent on the component operational parameters through user-defined functions.
The failure of one component propagates along the tree and, if critical, determines the "top event" occurrence, consisting in the whole system failure.
TARAS requires as input the system operational tree and the attribution, to each component, of a set of parameters characterizing the failure/maintenance features. In the following, the components parameters required as input data are discussed. Each component requires the definition of the failure rate value λ i , which can be: • a constant value; • a time dependent value: in this case, λ i can be set as dependent on the calendar time or on the equivalent time; • a value depending on the status of other components in the operational tree; • a mathematical formula, containing parameters of the component or of the whole plant; these may be related to the system characteristics, to the environment (favourable or unfavourable), to operational parameters (e.g. rotational speed, elaborated flow rate …).
Other than failure rate λ, the components require the definition of failure modes, according to the FMEA/FMECA theory. Each failure mode is associated to an occurrence probability value β, in the range between 0 and 1, defined by the user on the basis of data or experience; of course, the sum of all the β values for one component must be 1. To each failure mode corresponds a mean time to repair (MTTR). It is possible to account for different repair times in case of presence or not of a spare part in stock.
Also, scheduled maintenance can be imposed. The maintenance interventions may occur at fixed time intervals or may be set as dependent on the component equivalent time, so that the interventions are more frequent for heavily exploited components. Maintenance interventions modify the number of equivalent hours accumulated.
The parameters mentioned so far can be attributed at each level of the operational tree. This represents an advantage, as some information may be known at an ensemble level but not at a sub-component level or viceversa. Moreover, this allows to obtain a cross-eyed vision of the system, since for example one component can be seen as a unique block in terms of failure rate, while contemporarily considering the maintenance features of its crucial (and more expensive) components.
A Useful Device for Industrial Plants
The tree hierarchical architecture [2] has the disadvantage to propagate a failure at the higher levels immediately after its occurrence. This is acceptable for systems characterized by very fast dynamics and small time constants, such as electronic devices. Nevertheless, in many industrial plants some kinds of failure propagate to the upper levels with a delay, typically after the exhaustion of a storage.
The exigency to cope with this problem took the Authors to develop a device -namely the storage component -able to overtake the issue; this was done exploiting the basic elements of TARAS, without adding any sort of new code. The storage is a component including the two following sub-components:
• feeder: this represents the line which feeds the storage and is characterized by the failure rate of the underlying components. For example, in case of a simple hydraulic system it may be represented by the pump and the adduction pipe to a tank.
• reservoir: this is the sub-component responsible for the delay. The reservoir is characterized by formulas for the emptying time and for the number of equivalent hours.
The feeder and reservoir sub-components relate to the storage upper level with a redundancy parameter k/n = 1/2: the storage functions if at least one of its two subcomponents is working. This is schematically represented in Fig. 1 . The reservoir failure rate λ R is defined according to Eq. 1:
(1) S S being the storage status.
The reservoir contains a formula for the number of accumulated equivalent hours h eq_R indicated in Eq. 2 and a formula for the emptying time T e indicated in Eq. 3. Finally, a mean time to repair is defined for the storage, according to Eq. 5: (5) where is the material flow rate arriving from the feeder. The functioning of the storage device is described in the following.
When the feeder line is available its status is 1 and the storage component is available (S S = 1). When the feeder line has a failure, S F = 0; according to Eq. 2, the reservoir -available according to Eq. 4 -starts accumulating one equivalent hour for each time step t. The storage remains available as long as the equivalent hours h eq_R accumulated by the reservoir remain below the emptying time period T e , which is linked to the material flow rate and to the stored mass by Eq. 3. As soon as h eq_R ≥ T e , the reservoir becomes unavailable (see Eq. 4), and so does the storage; when in a complex transport system the storage becomes unavailable, the material flow interrupts. If there is no other feeding path, the whole system stops.
After a failure, the storage component is expected to return operative if two conditions are verified: 1) the feeder line is restored, S F turning again to 1. 2) the reservoir is again full.
To simulate the reservoir re-filling, the MTTR S value defined in Eq. 5 is used. The storage component remains unavailable until the complete reservoir re-filling, which occurs in a number of hours depending on the inlet material flow rate and on the mass of stored material M, according to Eq. 5.
The Test Case Plant
The feed line of a pulverized coal fired power plant was chosen as test case. The plant is composed by three supercritical units, for a total power output of 660 MW el . The transport line transfers the coal downloaded from ships to two covered storage parks (domes) and then to a coal bunker from which the three steam generators are fed. The design throughput is 3300 t/h.
The download, transport and storage operations are possible thanks to: continuous ship unloader (CSU) machines; overhead and underground belt conveyors connecting several towers; stacker-reclaimer machines for the coal storage and recovery in the domes; a tripper bay addicted to load the coal to the silos composing the bunker. The plant scheme is provided in Fig. 2 .
The ship downloading operations are delegated to two CSU machines, each designed for a throughput of 1650 t/h. A CSU is composed by a bucket elevator, able to move on rails running along the pier; the elevator bucket chain can be positioned into the ship holds through a rotating arm and can fit the holds thanks to variable geometry, assured by hydraulic cylinders. The CSU machines availability also depends on weather, downloading operations being interrupted if wind or wave conditions are too severe. Coal is lifted up to belt conveyors, running along the machine arm, where a first de-metallization occurs. Coal is then conveyed into a chute and deposited over the NC1 belt which runs along the pier up to the first tower, T1.
Tower T1 contains two crushers working in parallel, which reduce coal size down to 50 mm while eliminating most of the metal pieces. The two crushers can be bypassed. Tower T1 contains the NC2 belt (equipped with another metal detector) which changes the coal direction and discharges on NC3, the latter delivering the coal to tower T2. T3 and T4 towers are reached by, respectively, NC4 and NC5. To be remarked that coal can be delivered directly to NC9A or NC9B belt conveyors through a flow switching system installed in tower T3; this is used in case the components immediately downstream of T3 were out of order. Downstream of tower T4, the belt conveyor line is doubled so that NC6A and NC6B can reach the two storage domes Dome A and Dome B.
Inside the dome, the stacker machine disposes coal in a toroidal pile, through a directional arm equipped with a belt conveyor. Coal is then recovered from the pile by the reclaimer machine, consisting in a gantry equipped with two chain scrapers conveying coal from the pile to the dome centre; here, a vibrating chute feeds the underlying belt conveyor (NC7A or NC7B for, respectively, Dome A or Dome B).
Downstream of the domes, the double belt line proceeds to tower T4 where coal passes from NC7 to NC8 belts. A system of flow switches can direct the coal towards line A or B, increasing the whole system redundancy. The same line switch is present in tower T3, when coal passes from NC8 to NC9 belts .
The NC9 double line reaches tower T5, containing the "tripper bay". The latter consists in the two parallel belt conveyors NC10A and NC10B, each equipped with a tripper car. The tripper car can be simply described as a chute which can move on rails along the tripper bay; it bends the rubber belt by means of two drums and directs the coal flow into the desired bunker silo, located at the lower level. The operational tree of the global plant is represented in Fig. 3 . Labels indicate each possible path of the coal stream, from the pier to the bunker.
Owing to the many possible paths the coal flow can take, the operational tree of the plant results very complex. The scheme in Fig. 3 does not go into detail of the transport, downloading and storage machines. However, each mechanical device (CSU, Tripper …) was modeled basing on its sub-components, whose logical dependencies are described by a dedicated operational tree. For example, in Fig. 4 is sketched the tree of a belt conveyor, providing a double redundancy for the electric motor drive. 
Simulation
In this section, the steps followed by the TARAS algorithm during a run are described, so as the software output. It is important to remark that TARAS is not a dynamic simulator: for each run the system can be analyzed at a single operational regime. However, multiple run mode is provided, so that a scenario simulation at different operational regimes can be repeated and saved each time. This allows to investigate different off-design plant working conditions; also, simulating the same scenario condition for several times, a statistical evaluation is possible.
After the definition of the reference scenario (by the operational tree construction) and the input of the components parameters described in Section 2, the system processing phase can start. For each time step, the algorithm explores all the nodes of the operational tree, from the root to the furthest "leaves", in a recursive manner; for each node -both physical and logicalhaving a positive failure rate, the processor proceeds to the node status calculation, by the extraction of a random number x (comprised between 0 and 1) and its comparison with the node λ value; if x ≤ λ the component is declared out of order.
Once individuated the failure, the algorithm determines the component failure mode, exploiting the occurrence probability values β defined by the operator in the input phase. The processor extracts a random number y comprised between 0 and 1 and compares it with the cumulative failure occurrence probability, B; the latter is calculated as the integral of the β values attributed to each failure mode of the component. The failure mode is determined on the basis of the range of B in which falls the extracted y value.
The component remains out of order for a period equal to the MTTR attributed to the resulting failure mode. For each simulation time step, the following quantities are saved:
 the operation and failure hours of each physical and logical node;  the number of failure events and the instant of occurrence, for each physical and logical node;  the root operational state, in particular the information about the instant of failure occurrence, the total number of failures during the simulation, the mean time between failures (MTBF) and the mean time to repair (MTTR). The saved data are post-processed in order to obtain, as simulation output, the following results:  the plant availability, defined as the ratio between the number of hours of correct operation and the total number of simulated hours; the availability is visualized through a sector diagram;  the MTBF and the MTTR of the whole plant, visualized through histograms, indicating the minimum, maximum and average value of the MTBF and MTTR, the number of observations and the amplitude of the confidence band at 95%;  the report of all the failures verified during the simulation, included the moment of occurrence and the effect, critical or not for the plant operation. This allows to individuate the system crucial components. Also, the repairing costs are provided. the report of all the maintenance operations, including the time spent and the cost of each operation.
Results
In this section, the results of the TARAS application to the test case plant are provided. Since the TARAS software is not aimed to dynamic simulation, the plant was analyzed at its design throughput condition.
The software was employed to analyze the test case plant, in order to determine the overall plant availability and individuate the most critical components. The MTBF and the MTTR parameters were evaluated, so as the costs connected to the lack of production and to the repairing and maintenance interventions.
The simulation campaign envisaged the replication of 5 successive runs, each protracted for one month of plant operation. This allowed to obtain a wider vision of the plant behaviour, highlighting the occurrence of different failure and maintenance situations and permitting to provide a statistical assessment.
The failure rates to be attributed to the different mechanical components were derived from literature data [9, 10] , while the data of scheduled maintenance and repairing time and cost were provided by the personnel responsible for the plant operation and maintenance.
In Fig. 5 is represented the plant availability sector diagram. The diagram is provided for the run #5. In the diagram are indicated the number of hours of operation and those of stop; also, the related operation and stop percentages are indicated. As visible, in the run in object the plant has been working for 558 h and stopped for 162 h.
In Fig. 6 is shown the histogram indicating the time required to repair each failure occurred to the plant, either critical or not. The diagram refers to run #2. The diagram indicates that two failures -in particular two failures occurred to de-dusting systems installed in the towers -required a rather long time to be fixed, due to the missing spare parts in stock.
Tab. 1 reports the summary of the results for the five runs carried out (Scenario-1, 2, 3, 4 ,5). In the table, column 2, 3 and 4 indicate the main features of the critical failures (i.e. those failures which caused the plant stop).
In particular, for each critical failure are indicated the MTBF and MTTR in hours. Columns 5 and 6 report respectively the total number of failure events (critical or not) occurred in the run in object and the total cost for the repairing interventions. The table shows that, in general, all the runs are fairly coherent in terms of number of failure event and total cost of repair.
Tab. 2 shows some data which can be found in the reports automatically generated by the software. The table, containing data related to runs #3, 4 and 5, reports in the first column the time of correct operation; in the second column, the time of plant stop; in the third column, the number of critical failures occurred; in the fourth column, the average time of plant stop; in the fifth column the standard deviation of plant stop time with respect to the average value; the last two columns report the minimum and maximum stop time for the critical events. These data are useful in view of a statistical assessment of the simulations.
Conclusion
This paper presented a software for the FMEA/FMECA analysis of mechanical components, based on the system operational tree.
The TARAS computational tool is able to carry out a complete fault analysis of complex plants, allowing a cross-eyed vision of the system, since each component can be divided into its sub-components down to the desired level of detail; this feature is advantageous whenever the knowledge of failure rates, repairing costs etc. is incomplete. Failure rates can be set as constant values; can be defined through functions of time; can depend on the status of other components; or can be defined by a user-defined formula. Different failure modes can be set for each component, so as the maintenance program. The main novelty of the present work is the specific application of the fault analysis software to complex plants composed by several mechanical components, allowing the prediction of several parameters, among which availability, MTBF and MTTR.
To demonstrate the software potential, the coal transportation system of a large power plant was simulated.
The software provides as output the availability over a defined period other than the list, the history and the main parameters of each failure through easily interpretable tables, diagrams and reports. In particular, the values of MTTR and MTBF are provided, so as the criticality level of each failure (i.e. whether the failure has propagated or not up to the root level of the system). Also the maintenance aspect was evaluated, as the software can provide as output the list of the repair and maintenance operations (scheduled or not) and their cost.
